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Abstract: We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functions in
discrete-time nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic games from open-loop Nash equilibria.
Although similar inverse problems have been investigated in the optimal control literature where
there is a single player (or decision maker), there has been limited attention given to the inverse
dynamic game problem with multiple (competing) players. By exploiting the minimum principle
of optimal control, we propose a method of inverse dynamic games for when the information
structure of the game is open-loop. Our method involves solving a system of linear equations
and is able to recover the true unknown parameters (up to an unknown scaling factor) whenever
a testable rank condition holds. We illustrate our method in an example two-player game.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic games are a powerful tool for analysing conflicts
of interest between players (or decision makers) in numer-
ous fields ranging from biology and ecology to economics
and engineering (Basar and Olsder, 1999; Isaacs, 1965;
Dockner, 2000). A considerable quantity of theory has
therefore been dedicated to the solution of dynamic games
under a variety of optimality concepts. In particular,
the Nash equilibrium solution of noncooperative dynamic
games has been extensively investigated in order to predict
player control inputs (or decisions) given their cost func-
tions (Basar and Olsder, 1999; Dockner, 2000). However,
there exist few (if any) treatments of the inverse dynamic
game problem of computing the underlying player cost
functions from observed player Nash equilibrium solutions.
In this paper, we pose and solve this inverse dynamic game
problem for non-zerosum noncooperative dynamic games
played with an open-loop information structure.
Noncooperative dynamic games involve multiple players
repeatedly making decisions with the aim of optimising
their individual cost functions. The games are dynamic
since the order in which decisions are made is important,
and they are noncooperative since each player attempts
to optimise their own cost function without regard for
the objectives of the other players (Basar and Olsder,
1999). Although noncooperative dynamic games may be
solved under various information structures (e.g., players
having different information about the game state and
the controls chosen by the other players), open-loop Nash
equilibrium solutions are of particular interest since they
provide a benchmark for the outcome of the game (Eng-
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werda, 2008). These open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions
describe the control inputs (or decisions) that players
should select given only knowledge of the initial game state
so that they can do no better when every other player
selects their open-loop Nash equilibrium control inputs
(Basar and Olsder, 1999).
Although most game theory literature has focused on iden-
tifying and analysing equilibrium solutions, there has been
recent interest in the problem of recovering player cost
functions from example equilibrium solutions (Kuleshov
and Schrijvers, 2015; Bertsimas et al., 2015; Tsai et al.,
2016). These inverse game problems are closely related to
the problem of inverse optimisation in the case of static
games (Kuleshov and Schrijvers, 2015; Bertsimas et al.,
2015), and the problem of inverse optimal control (or in-
verse reinforcement learning) in the case of dynamic games
(Kuleshov and Schrijvers, 2015). Despite the close connec-
tions between the problems of inverse optimal control and
inverse dynamic games, there has been limited progress
in solving inverse N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative
dynamic game problems that involve computing the cost
functions of N -players from Nash equilibrium solutions.
Most recently, the minimum principle of optimal control
was exploited in (Tsai et al., 2016) to propose a method
of solving inverse two-player zero-sum dynamic games.
This approach is analogous to recent developments in
inverse optimal control for discrete-time (Molloy et al.,
2016) and continuous-time (Johnson et al., 2013; Hatz
et al., 2012) systems that also exploit versions of the
minimum principle. However, these recent developments
in inverse optimal control and inverse two-player zero-sum
dynamic games are yet to be exploited for the purpose
of solving inverse N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative
dynamic game problems.
The main contribution of this paper is the proposal of a
method for computing unknown parameters of player cost
functions from observed open-loop Nash equilibrium so-
lutions in N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic
games. Similar to previous work in the problems of inverse
optimal control and inverse two-player zero-sum dynamic
games, our proposed method exploits the minimum prin-
ciple of optimal control to transform the inverse dynamic
game problem into the problem of solving a system of
linear equations. Importantly, our treatment of inverse N -
player nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic games may
be viewed as a generalisation of the treatments of inverse
optimal control and inverse two-player zero-sum dynamic
games previously undertaken in (Tsai et al., 2016) and
(Molloy et al., 2016).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section
2 we pose our inverse dynamic game problem. In Section
3 we develop our proposed method of inverse dynamic
games. In Section 4 we specialise our results to the prob-
lems of inverse optimal control and inverse two-player zero-
sum dynamic games. Finally, we present an illustrative
example in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We will consider a discrete-time N -player nonzero-sum
noncooperative dynamic game. Let us define the discrete-
time state process of this game over the fixed time duration
k ∈ K , {1, . . . ,K} as
xk+1 = fk
(
xk, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k
)
, x1 = x¯ (1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector, fk (·, ·, . . . , ·) are
(potentially) nonlinear functions, and uik ∈ U ik are control
inputs belonging to the control sets U ik ⊂ Rmi for i ∈ N ,{1, . . . , N}. We will assume that the ith sequence of control
inputs ui ,
{
ui1, . . . , u
i
K
}
is selected by a player who is
attempting to minimise the stage-additive cost function
J i
(
u1, . . . , uN , θi
)
,
K∑
k=1
gi
(
xk+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , xk, θ
i
)
(2)
subject to the dynamic constraints of the state process (1)
given only knowledge of the initial state x¯ (i.e., there is no
state feedback or cooperation) (Basar and Olsder, 1999,
p. 266). In this paper, we shall further assume that the
component functions gi (·, ·, . . . , ·, ·, ·) of each player’s stage
cost function are linear combinations of M basis functions
gij (·, ·, . . . , ·, ·) in the sense that
gi
(
xk+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , xk, θ
i
)
,
M∑
j=1
θijg
i
j
(
xk+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , xk
) (3)
where θi , [θi1, θi2, . . . , θiM ]′ is a parameter vector belong-
ing to the set Θi ⊂ RM for i ∈ N , {1, . . . , N}. This
parameterisation of the stage cost functions is common in
the literature of inverse optimal control (Hatz et al., 2012;
Johnson et al., 2013; Molloy et al., 2016) and inverse two-
player zero-sum dynamic games (Tsai et al., 2016).
The solutions to the discrete-time N -player nonzero-sum
noncooperative dynamic game (1) and (2) played with
an open-loop information structure are open-loop Nash
equilibria. The control trajectories ui∗ ,
{
ui∗1 , . . . , u
i∗
K
}
for
i ∈ N constitute an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution
to the N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative game (1) and
(2) with parameters θi ∈ Θ for i ∈ N if and only if the
inequalities
J1
(
u1∗, u2∗, . . . , uN∗, θ1
) ≤ J1 (u1, u2∗, . . . , uN∗, θ1)
J2
(
u1∗, u2∗, . . . , uN∗, θ2
) ≤ J2 (u1∗, u2, . . . , uN∗, θ2)
...
JN
(
u1∗, u2∗, . . . , uN∗, θN
) ≤ JN (u1∗, u2∗, . . . , uN , θN)
(4)
hold for all feasible player control trajectories ui with
uik ∈ U ik for all k ∈ K and all i ∈ N (Basar and
Olsder, 1999, p. 266). We shall denote the states associated
with the open-loop Nash equilibrium control sequences
ui∗ as x∗k for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K + 1}, and we shall let
x∗ ,
{
x∗1, . . . , x
∗
K+1
}
.
In the inverse N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative dy-
namic game problem, we are given the state trajectory
x∗ and the control trajectories ui∗ for i ∈ N that sat-
isfy the conditions (4) of an open-loop Nash equilibrium
solution for parameters θi = θi∗ ∈ Θi for i ∈ N. We
assume that some (or all) of the player cost function
parameter vectors θi∗ are unknown. Our aim is to recover
the unknown parameters θi∗ from the observed open-loop
Nash equilibrium solution trajectories given knowledge
of the process dynamics fk (·, ·, . . . , ·), the constraint sets
U ik, and the basis functions g
i
j (·, ·, . . . , ·) for i ∈ N and
j ∈M , {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Finally, we note that in the inverse
dynamic game problem, the parameters θi∗ may only be
recovered up to unknown scaling factors 0 < ri < ∞ for
any i ∈ N since if the trajectories x∗ and ui∗ for i ∈ N
satisfy the open-loop Nash equilibrium conditions (4) with
θi = θi∗, then they must also satisfy (4) with θi = riθi∗
for all 0 < ri <∞.
3. INVERSE DYNAMIC GAMES
In this section, we propose a method for solving the inverse
dynamic game problem by exploiting necessary conditions
for open-loop Nash equilibria derived from the discrete-
time minimum principle of optimal control theory.
3.1 Necessary Conditions for Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
We require the following assumptions in order to present
necessary conditions for the existence of open-loop Nash
equilibria in the N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative
dynamic game (1) and (2).
Assumption 1. The functions fk (·, ·, . . . , ·) are convex on
Rn × Rm1 × · · · × RmN for all k ∈ K.
Assumption 2. The functions fk
(·, u1k, . . . , uNk ) are contin-
uously differentiable on Rn for all k ∈ K.
Assumption 3. The basis functions gij
(·, u1k, . . . , uNk , ·) are
continuously differentiable on Rn × Rn for all i ∈ N, and
all j ∈M.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are conditions on the dynamics
of the game and are trivially satisfied by linear games,
but exclude some classes of nonlinear games. Similarly,
Assumption 3 is a condition on the basis functions of the
player cost functions that is satisfied by quadratic cost
functions (which are common). All three assumptions are
standard in the study of N -player nonzero-sum noncoop-
erative dynamic games, see for example (Basar and Olsder,
1999, Chapter 6).
Before we introduce necessary conditions for the existence
of open-loop Nash equilibria, let us define the Hamiltonian
of the ith player as
Hik
(
λik+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , xk, θ
i
)
, gi
(
xk+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , xk, θ
i
)
+ λi′k+1fk
(
xk, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k
)
for k ∈ K and i ∈ N where the vectors λik+1 ∈ Rn are
costate (or adjoint) variables. We also define the shorthand
notation
fk , fk
(
x∗k, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k
)
,
gik , gi
(
x∗k+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k, θ
i∗) , and
gij,k , gij
(
x∗k+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k
)
for i ∈ N and k ∈ K, and we shall denote the matrix of
partial derivatives of fk with respect to xk (and evaluated
at x∗k and u
i∗
k for i ∈ N) as
∇xkfk ,

∂f1k(x
∗
k,u
1∗
k ,...,u
N∗
k )
∂x1,k
. . .
∂fnk (x
∗
k,u
1∗
k ,...,u
N∗
k )
∂x1,k
...
. . .
...
∂f1k(x
∗
k,u
1∗
k ,...,u
N∗
k )
∂xn,k
. . .
∂fnk (x
∗
k,u
1∗
k ,...,u
N∗
k )
∂xn,k
 .
We shall similarly denote the matrices of partial deriva-
tives of gi (·, ·, . . . , ·, ·) and gij (·, ·, . . . , ·) with respect to xk
and xk+1 (evaluated at x
∗
k, x
∗
k+1, u
i∗, and θi∗ for i ∈ N)
as ∇xkgik, ∇xk+1gik, ∇xkgij,k, and ∇xk+1gij,k, respectively
where i ∈ N and j ∈M.
Under Assumptions 1 – 3, Theorem 6.1 of (Basar and
Olsder, 1999) gives that if x∗ and ui∗ for i ∈ N describe
an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution to the N -player
nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic game (1) and (2)
with parameter vectors θi = θi∗ ∈ Θi for i ∈ N, then
there exists player costate vectors λik ∈ Rn given by the
backwards recursion
λik = ∇xkf ′k
[
λik+1 +∇xk+1gi′k
]
+∇xkgi′k (5)
for k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} with λiK+1 = 0 such that
ui∗k = arg min
ui
k
∈Ui
k
Hik
(
λik+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
i−1∗
k ,
uik, u
i+1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k, θ
i
) (6)
for all k ∈ K and all i ∈ N.
3.2 Proposed Method of Inverse Dynamic Games
We will now exploit the open-loop Nash equilibrium nec-
essary conditions (5) and (6) to propose our method of
inverse dynamic games. We first require the following
result establishing that the player costate vectors λik are
linear in θi∗ for any i ∈ N.
Lemma 1. Consider the N -player nonzero-sum noncoop-
erative game (1) and (2) with cost function parameters
θi = θi∗ ∈ Θi for i ∈ N. Then the player costate vectors
are linear in the parameters θi in the sense that
λik =
M∑
j=1
θijλ
i
j,k, (7)
for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} and all i ∈ N where we define the
costate component vectors as
λij,k , ∇xkf ′k
[
λij,k+1 +∇xk+1gi′j,k
]
+∇xkgi′j,k, (8)
for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, all i ∈ N, and all j ∈ M. Here, we
define λij,K+1 , 0 for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M.
Proof. We prove the lemma assertion (7) using backwards
induction. Consider any i ∈ N. We first recall that λiK+1 =
0, and so (5) and (3) imply that
λiK =
M∑
j=1
θij
[∇xKf ′K∇xK+1gi′j,K +∇xKgi′j,K]
=
M∑
j=1
θijλ
i
j,K ,
where the last line follows from (8). For some k + 1 ∈
{3, . . . ,K + 1}, we now assume that (7) holds so that
λik+1 =
∑M
j=1 θ
i
jλ
i
j,k+1 with λ
i
j,k+1 given by (8). Proceed-
ing by induction, we consider k, and note that (5) gives
λik = ∇xkf ′k
[
λik+1 +∇xk+1gi′k
]
+∇xkgi′k
=
M∑
j=1
θij
[∇xkf ′k (λij,k+1 +∇xk+1gi′j,k)+∇xkgi′j,k]
=
M∑
j=1
θijλ
i
j,k
where the second line follows from the induction assump-
tion that λik+1 =
∑M
j=1 θ
i
jλ
i
j,k+1, and the last line follows
from (8). Since we have shown that the lemma assertion
(7) holds for k = K, and since if it holds for some k +
1 ∈ {3, . . . ,K + 1} we have shown that it must hold for k,
we conclude that it holds for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}. The proof
is complete. 2
A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is that we may rewrite
the player Hamiltonians as linear functions of the param-
eters θi in the sense that
Hik
(
λik+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k, θ
i
)
=
N∑
j=1
θijH
i
j,k,
for all k ∈ K and all i ∈ N where we define the Hamiltonian
component vectors as
Hij,k , gij
(
x∗k+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k
)
+ λi′j,k+1fk
(
x∗k, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k
)
,
for all i ∈ N, all j ∈ M, and all k ∈ K. It follows that the
partial derivatives of the Hamiltonians with respect to the
control inputs are also linear in θi in the sense that
∇ui
k
Hik
(
λik+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k, θ
i
)
=
M∑
j=1
θij∇uikH
i
j,k, (9)
for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ K where
∇ui
k
Hij,k , ∇uikg
i
j,k +∇uikfkλ
i
j,k+1,
for all i ∈ N, all j ∈ M, and all k ∈ K. Importantly,
the components Hij,k and ∇uikHij,k are independent of the
unknown parameter vectors θi. This linear property of
the Hamiltonians is instrumental in establishing our main
inverse dynamic game result. To establish our main result,
let us first define the Hamiltonian gradient matrix
ξi ,

∇ui1Hi1,1 . . . ∇ui1HiM,1
. . .
. . .
...
∇ui
K
Hi1,K . . . ∇uiKHiM,K
 ∈ RKmi×M ,
and let us introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4. The player Nash equilibrium controls ui∗k
are in the interior (i.e., not the boundary) of the sets U ik
for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ K.
Assumption 4 excludes the possibility of using open-loop
Nash equilibria occurring at the boundary of the control
constraint sets U ik for the purpose of inverse dynamic
games. Although this assumption is restrictive, it is easily
checked given knowledge of the control sequences ui∗ and
the sets U ik for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ K.
We now establish our main inverse dynamic game result.
Theorem 2. Consider any player i ∈ N in the N -player
nonzero-sum noncooperative game (1) and (2) with cost
function parameters θi = θi∗ ∈ RM . Suppose that As-
sumptions 1 – 4 hold, and that there exists some 0 < ri <
∞ such that riθi∗ ∈ Θi where Θi = {θi ∈ RN : θi1 = 1}. If
rank
(
ξ¯i
)
= M where ξ¯i , [e1, ξi′]′ ∈ R(Kmi+1)×M , then
θi = riθi∗ is a unique solution to the linear system of
equations
ξ¯iθi = e1 (10)
where e1 , [1, 0, . . . , 0]′ is a column vector of appropriate
dimensions with 1 in its first component and zeros else-
where.
Proof. Consider any i ∈ N, and let θi = riθi∗. The
Hamiltonian condition (6) holding under Assumptions 1,
2, and 3 implies that
∇ui
k
Hik
(
λik+1, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k , x
∗
k, θ
i
)
= 0
for all k ∈ K since ui∗k is in the interior of U ik for all
k ∈ K by Assumption 4. By recalling (9), which follows
from Lemma 1, it follows that
M∑
j=1
θij∇uikH
i
j,k = 0
for all k ∈ K. These Hamiltonian conditions therefore
imply that ξiθi = 0 and the system of linear equations
(10) follows from the theorem condition that θi1 = 1. The
theorem assertion follows. 2
Theorem 2 transforms the inverse N -player nonzero-sum
noncooperative dynamic game problem into the problem
of solving a system of linear equations for each player
i ∈ N to recover θi∗ (up to an unknown scaling factor).
This transformation holds regardless of the linearity of the
game dynamics (1) provided that the convexity and differ-
entiability assumptions of Theorem 2 are satisfied. Our
proposed method of inverse dynamic games is therefore
to form the matrix ξi, verify that rank
(
ξ¯i
)
= M holds,
and then solve the system of linear equations (10) for each
player i ∈ N.
In general, the system of linear equations (10) will be
consistent with θi = riθi∗ as a solution. The rank condition
of Theorem 2 is necessary and sufficient for ensuring that
θi = riθi∗ is the unique solution to (10) for i ∈ N. If
this rank condition is not satisfied, other solutions to (10)
are possible and these solutions will vary from the true
(unknown) player cost function parameters θi∗ in more
than scale. The rank condition imposes mild conditions on
the structure of the player cost functions, the dynamics
of the game, and on the nature of the open-loop Nash
equilibria. For example, it implies a minimum horizon K ≥
(M − 1)/mi that allows the ith player’s parameters to be
recovered uniquely (up to an unknown scaling constant).
It also implies that the inverse dynamic game problem is
ill-posed when the initial state x∗1 is an equilibrium point
of the dynamics (1) and the Nash equilibrium controls ui∗k
are zero for all k ∈ K.
4. SPECIALISATION TO INVERSE OPTIMAL
CONTROL AND INVERSE TWO-PLAYER
ZERO-SUM DYNAMIC GAME PROBLEMS
In this section, we discuss the specialisation of our inverse
N -player dynamic game results to the problems of inverse
optimal control and inverse two-player zero-sum dynamic
games.
4.1 Inverse Optimal Control
When N = 1, our inverse N -player nonzero-sum nonco-
operative dynamic game problem reduces to the inverse
optimal control problem of finding the vector of cost func-
tion parameters θ given the state and control trajectories
that solve (11). To see this connection, we note that the
N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative game (1) and (2)
with N = 1 is equivalent to the optimal control problem
inf
u
J (u, θ)
s.t. xk+1 = fk(xk, uk), k ∈ K
uk ∈ Uk, k ∈ K
x1 = x¯
(11)
where uk , u1k, u , {u1, u2, . . . , uK} = u1, Uk , U1k ,
θ , θ1 ∈ RM , and J , J1.
Under Assumptions 1 – 4, Theorem 2 transforms the
inverse optimal control problem into the problem of solv-
ing the systems of linear equations (10) with i = 1.
Analogous results specific to inverse optimal control have
recently been developed in (Molloy et al., 2016) without
the convexity condition of Assumption 1. We require this
convexity assumption due to our use of (Basar and Olsder,
1999, Theorem 6.1) which gives necessary conditions for
an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution to the N -player
nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic game. In contrast,
(Molloy et al., 2016) avoids this assumption by exploiting
necessary conditions for optimal control problems that do
not rely on the convexity of the dynamics. Our results are
however significant because they establish a new connec-
tion between the well-known problem of inverse optimal
control, and the newer topic of inverse dynamic games.
4.2 Inverse Two-Player Zero-Sum Dynamic Games
Our inverse N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative dy-
namic game problem is also closely related to the problem
of inverse two-player zero-sum dynamic games. Indeed,
two-player zero-sum dynamic games are an important class
of N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic games.
The N -player nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic game
(1) and (2) becomes a two-player zero-sum dynamic game
by setting N = 2 and defining the shared player cost
function parameters θ , θ1 = −θ2 along with the shared
basis functions
gj
(
xk+1, u
1
k, u
2
k, xk
)
, g1j
(
xk+1, u
1
k, u
2
k, xk
)
= g2j
(
xk+1, u
1
k, u
2
k, xk
)
for all j ∈ M. Under this cost function parametrisation,
player 1 is the minimiser and player 2 is the maximiser of
the shared cost function
J
(
u1k, u
2
k, θ
)
, J1
(
u1k, u
2
k, θ
1
)
= −J2 (u1k, u2k, θ2) . (12)
The inequalities (4) defining the open-loop Nash equilib-
rium control sequences u1∗ and u2∗ of the two-player zero-
sum dynamic game are then equivalent to the saddle-point
condition:
J
(
u1∗, u2, θ
) ≤ J (u1∗, u2∗, θ) ≤ J (u1, u2∗, θ) (13)
for all admissible player control sequences u1 and u2
with u1k ∈ U1k and u2k ∈ U2k for all k ∈ K. In the
following corollary, we specialise our results of Theorem 2
to the problem of computing the parameters θ of the two-
player zero-sum dynamic game from the state and control
trajectories x∗, u1∗, and u2∗ that satisfy the saddle-point
condition (13).
Corollary 3. Consider the two-player zero-sum dynamic
game (1) and (12) with cost function parameters θ =
θ∗ ∈ RM . Suppose that Assumptions 1 – 4 hold, and that
there exists some 0 < r < ∞ such that rθ∗ ∈ Θ where
Θ =
{
θ ∈ RM : θ1 = 1
}
. If rank (Ξ) = M where
Ξ ,
[
e1, ξ
1′, ξ2′
]′
,
then θ = rθ∗ is a unique solution to the linear system of
equations
Ξθ = e1. (14)
Proof. Let θ = rθ∗. In this two-player zero-sum dynamic
game we have that θ = θ1 = −θ2. Thus, setting θ =
1 implies that θ1 = 1 which forces θ
2
1 = −1. Under
Assumptions 1 – 4, Theorem 2 therefore gives that ξ1θ1 =
e1 and ξ
2θ2 = −e1, and so ξ1θ = e1 and ξ2θ = e1.
Rewriting these two systems of linear equations as one
gives (14) and the corollary assertion follows. 2
An inverse two-player zero-sum game result similar to
Corollary 3 was previously established in (Tsai et al., 2016,
Theorem 1) under the same set of assumptions. In light of
Corollary 3, our Theorem 2 is therefore a generalisation
of the two-player zero-sum dynamic game result of (Tsai
et al., 2016, Theorem 1).
5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate our method of inverse dynamic
games in a two-player collision avoidance game. Consider
two players moving on a two-dimensional Cartesian plane
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
x Location
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
y 
Lo
ca
tio
n
Player 1 Start
Player 2 Start
Player 1
Player 2
Fig. 1. Illustrative Example: Player open-loop Nash equi-
librium state trajectories for a horizon of K = 9.
The players are initially on a collision course with
player 1 starting at Cartesian location (1, 0) with a
desired heading of ψ1 = pi/2, and Player 2 starting
at Cartesian location (1, 2) with a desired heading of
ψ2 = −pi/2.
and let xik ∈ R2 be the Cartesian location of player i with
i ∈ N = {1, 2} for k ∈ K ∪K + 1. The player positions xik
evolve from their given initial values xi1 according to the
discrete-time non-linear kinematic equation
xik+1 = x
i
k + v
[
cos
(
uik
)
sin
(
uik
)] (15)
for k ∈ K where v is the player speed (in units per time
step), and uik ∈ [0, 2pi) is the player heading command.
The state process of the game follows by letting xk =
[x1′k , x
2′
k ]
′ ∈ R4 for k ∈ K ∪K + 1.
In this example, each player seeks to maintain a constant
desired heading ψi ∈ [0, 2pi) whilst avoiding collisions. We
encode these objectives in the player cost functions by
defining the stage cost
gi
(
xk+1, u
1
k, u
2
k, xk, θ
i
)
= θi1δ
12
k (xk)
−1
+ θi2
(
uik − ψi
)2
(16)
for i ∈ N where
δ12k (xk) ,
(
x11,k − x21,k
)2
+
(
x12,k − x22,k
)2
is the squared distance between the players at time k. The
first term in (16) therefore describes the player’s preference
to avoid collisions, and the second term in (16) describes
the player’s preference to maintain the heading ψi.
For the purpose of illustrating our method of inverse
dynamic games, we calculated Nash equilibrium state
x∗ and control ui∗ trajectories for the two-player game
with dynamics (15), player stage cost functions (16), and
parameters θ1∗ = [1, 3]′ and θ2∗ = [1, 10]′. We selected
a horizon of K = 9, a player speed of v = 0.25 units
per second, and desired player headings of ψ1 = pi/2 and
ψ2 = −pi/2. The computed player Nash equilibrium state
and control trajectories are shown in Figures 1 and 2,
respectively.
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Fig. 2. Illustrative Example: Player open-loop Nash equi-
librium control trajectories for a horizon of K = 9.
Player 1 has a desired heading of ψ1 = pi/2, and
Player 2 has a desired heading of ψ2 = −pi/2.
We applied our method of inverse dynamic games to
compute the parameters θi and the desired headings ψi
from these Nash equilibrium state and control trajectories.
In order to applying our method, we first noted that
the open-loop Nash equilibrium control trajectories ui∗
for the game with player dynamics (15) and stage cost
functions (16) are also open-loop Nash equilibrium control
trajectories for the game with player dynamics (15) and
the auxiliary stage cost functions
gi
(
xk+1, u
1
k, u
2
k, xk, θ
i
)
= θi1δ
12
k (xk)
−1
+ θi2
(
uik
)2
+ θi3u
i
k
(17)
where we define the extra parameter θi3 , −2θi2ψi for
i ∈ N. To see that the open-loop Nash equilibrium control
trajectories are the same for this game with either the
stage cost functions (16) or (17), we note that each
function in (16) only differs from the associated function
in (17) by the constant term θi2
(
ψi
)2
. Importantly, the
auxiliary stage cost functions (17) are weighted sums of
known basis functions and are therefore of the form we
require for application of our method of inverse dynamic
games established in Theorem 2.
Using the Nash equilibrium trajectory x∗ shown in Fig. 1
together with the associated control trajectories ui∗ shown
in Fig. 2, we formed the matrices ξ¯i using the auxiliary
stage cost functions (17). We then verified that rank
(
ξ¯i
)
=
3 held and we solved the system of linear equations (10)
for the unknown parameters θij for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
i ∈ N. The computed parameters were θ1 = [1, 3,−3pi]′
and θ2 = [1, 10, 10pi]′. By recalling that ψi = −θi3/(2θi2),
these computed parameters can be seen to correspond
exactly to the true values of the original stage cost function
parameters θi∗ and the desired headings ψ1 = pi/2 and
ψ2 = −pi/2.
6. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a method for computing the parameters
of player cost functions in N -player nonzero-sum nonco-
operative dynamic games from open-loop Nash equilibria.
Our method exploits necessary conditions for open-loop
Nash equilibria previously established through the min-
imum principle of optimal control. Under our method,
the problem of inverse noncooperative dynamic games is
transformed into the problem of solving a system of linear
equations, and we are able to recover the true unknown
parameters (up to an unknown scaling factor) whenever
a testable rank condition holds. Our method is successful
in recovering the cost function parameters of two players
in simulations of a collision avoidance game. Future work
will extend our method to enable the use of multiple
Nash equilibria, and we will investigate inverse differential
games (i.e., inverse dynamic games in continuous-time).
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